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The Re-Emerging Role of the State in Contemporary Russia 
 
Abstract 
I examine ownership structure of Russian firms during the 1998-2006 period, where a 
greater emphasis is placed on motivations behind increased government ownership in the 
latter years, when oligarchs’ opportunistic influence on the firm diminished as state 
ownership in companies correspondingly increased. As this phenomenon is also 
consistent with improved corporate growth during the period, I argue that state re-
intervention acted as an effective substitute governing mechanism to constrain wealth-
tunnelling behaviour of corporate insiders and local bureaucrats in a country defined by a 
weak property rights system. 
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1. Introduction 
Russia is an important example of an economic system having ill-defined property rights, 
persistently lacking a contractual mechanism acting to enhance its commercial 
development. This is particularly significant in the post Soviet regime, when the nation 
has distanced itself from state-mandated output and investment targets by freeing-up 
markets and allowing a market-clearing prices allocation system to evolve. A key aspect 
of Yeltsin’s “privatisation” initiative was the freeing-up of commercial and industrial 
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enterprises from direct state control by allowing major corporations to become privately 
owned through a mechanism of management buyouts and issuance of vouchers and 
shares. The objective of the programme was to enable private economic agents to decide 
on the optimal level of production and investment, which should lead to an improved 
firm performance.   
However, as is generally accepted, such reforms led to a severe economic 
contraction because of the absence of a well-defined and enforceable property rights 
system, which is necessary for the emergence of efficient market institutions. The 
absence of the latter facilitated the ability of various ruling elite groups, such as the new 
business quasi-owners and local bureaucrats to engage in extensive asset-stripping. For 
instance, the managers of Soviet enterprises were able to attain large ownership stakes in 
the newly-privatised companies at subsidised rates due to their superior knowledge of the 
Soviet bribing system, which prospered during the Yeltsin era (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1998). Managerial ownership became concentrated, and the new “owners” seized assets 
and subsequently sold them to their own private businesses (Rapaczynski, 1996; Alexeev, 
1999; Black et al., 2000; Sonin, 2000; Kuznetsov and Muravyev, 2001). 
The “loans for shares” scheme is often referred to as the most scandalous in the 
history of privatisation (Hedlund, 2001). Banks and other financial institutions provided 
government with loans in exchange for shares, which were treated as collateral in the 
case of government’s default on repayment of debt. Unsurprisingly, the auctions for such 
shares were held in a non-transparent way, where banks with close political ties to the 
government obtained the top bidding position (Appel, 1997). After the government had 
defaulted on its debt, the auctions for shares took place, and these were held in such a 
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way as to restrict the number of bidders in order to keep share prices artificially low. As a 
result, shares of Russia’s most desirable firms were placed with a very small number of 
banks for significantly less than they were worth (Dyck, 2002; Puffer and McCarthy, 
2003). In turn, such banks colluded in wealth redistribution, as they reallocated resources 
to favoured industries and individuals instead of acting as intermediaries between 
borrowers and lenders (Thomson, 2002; Spicer and Pyle, 2003). Local and regional 
government officials also managed to gain control over many corporations (Guriev and 
Rachinsky, 2005) and used their increased power to pursue wealth tunnelling agenda. 
In short, it can be argued that the new class of quasi-owners was unsure about its 
future income claims, hence it chose to adopt shorter investment horizons than the social 
optimum, which led to asset-stripping, corresponding fall in production and extensive 
capital flight (Stiglitz, 2002; Hoff and Stiglitz, 2004; Ross, 2004). Stiglitz (2002) believes 
that as privatisation occurred without the essential prerequisites, such as a well-defined 
property rights system, it did not offer incentives for effective private ownership – instead 
it offered an incentive to “grab” the resources and engage in the tunnelling of wealth.  
Consequently, following a period of economic stagnation, the Putin regime re-
introduced an active role of the state in the economy in order to constrain wealth 
diversion by corporate insiders and local bureaucrats. Significantly, although it can be 
said that at present many Russian corporations can be defined by ownership and 
corporate governance characteristics of Western corporations, there is also an important 
difference in that the central state often has a major ownership stake as well as corporate 
governance presence in the firm. While a strong property rights system still remains 
Russia’s long-term goal, the new partnership between the central state and private 
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investors may have acted as an effective substitute to constrain wealth tunnelling 
behaviour, as is demonstrated by improved performance of Russian corporations during 
the Putin regime.   
 The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 examines literature 
which focuses on immediate post privatisation corporate ownership trends as well the re-
emerging role of the central state with the advent of the Putin regime. Section 3 provides 
detailed ownership data on firms which traded on the Russian Trading System stock 
exchange (RTS) over the 1998-2006 period, signalling that the central state did indeed 
become a corporate co-partner in firms defined by high hold-up costs. The section also 
presents a rationale for the federal government’s role in firm ownership structure and its 
corporate governance. Finally, Section 4 offers further discussion and conclusion. 
 
2. Corporate ownership in Russia  
2.1. Post privatisation ownership trends 
Hoffman (2002) characterised the first decade of Russia’s leap towards the free market as 
one plagued by insider dealings, theft and widespread masked money flows. It is, 
therefore, unsurprising that consistent and reliable information about the new owners 
does not exist. Most of corporate ownership literature focuses on survey data, as official 
company reports fail to identify ultimate owners, who chose to remain anonymous in 
order to conceal their wealth tunnelling behaviour. Nevertheless, the existing studies 
provide strong evidence that Yeltsin’s privatisation initiative failed to create a pool of 
outside investors, which Boycko et al. (1995) hoped would be free of political ties and 
interference. While by the end of mass privatisation period 77.2 percent of large and 
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medium size firms were acquired by private owners, which corresponded to 88.3 percent 
of Russia’s industrial output (Debardeleben, 1999),  70 percent of privatised firms were 
associated with insider ownership (Frydman et al., 1999).  
For example, Filatotchev et al. (1999) use a sample of over 300 firms in Russia 
over the 1995-1996 period to illustrate that managers extensively accumulated firm 
shares and colluded with firm employees in order to entrench insider control and exclude 
outsider investors. Sprenger (2002) notes that outside shareholder rights were disregarded 
by self-dealing management, when the latter engaged in asset-stripping, transfer pricing 
and share dilution.  
Furthermore, the Yeltsin regime was also associated with the decreased power of 
the central state and a corresponding increased power of regional bureaucrats (Robinson, 
2002). The new decentralisation policies accommodated local and regional government 
officials in diverting corporate control, which was then used for their personal enrichment 
goals (Coffee, 1999; Fox and Heller, 2000). 
The period also saw the emergence of Financial-Industrial Groups (FIGs). These 
consisted of a combination of banks and industrial enterprises, which were often 
characterised by cross-ownership based on personal ties. Many FIGs were a result of the 
loans for shares scheme, having significant political power to assist their insider dealings. 
Notably, while Perotti and Gelfer (2001) find a negative relationship between cash flows 
and investment in FIGs, consistent with the reallocation of resources and perhaps a more 
effective financial reallocation, they could not rule out the stripping of assets from more 
profitable enterprises by insiders.  
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In summary, it is often posited that Russia’s privatisation process was an 
incredible failure. Corporate insiders and local bureaucrats have amassed most of 
minority shareholders’ stakes, and ownership and control of Russian corporations was 
defined by highly concentrated ownership structures, where oligarch quasi-owners 
engaged in extensive self-dealing (Black, 1998) in an environment characterised by a 
weak legal system. Unsurprisingly, new enterprises failed to emerge, Russia was 
unsuccessful in attracting foreign investment capital and the objective of maximising the 
long-term corporate growth proved illusive.  
 
2.2. The re-emergence of the state under the Putin regime  
As previously discussed, the initial period of Russian commercial restructuring was 
typically deemed as unsuccessful and it is widely believed that in large part this was due 
to the absence of a legal system, which has been incapable of imposing well-defined 
property rights. However, in contrast to the earlier period, the Russian economy 
registered a significant GDP growth (of 8 percent) in 2000, followed by similar growth 
patterns in the subsequent years. For the first time since the Yeltsin regime, the country 
had witnessed increased levels of domestic and foreign investment. Moreover, despite the 
lack of an effective legal system during the period Russian corporations thrived. Figure 1 
below displays the improved performance of the Russian corporate sector, as is exhibited 
by the Russian Trading System stock exchange index during the period. 
                                                          [insert Figure 1 here] 
 
 8 
It is generally recognised that Russia’s fast economic recovery can in large part be 
attributed to the rise in world oil and gas prices, where the abundance of natural resources 
has undoubtedly contributed to Russia’s economic fortune. However, in this paper I 
suggest that the reforms introduced under the Putin regime also played a significant, if 
not a dominant role in Russia’s dramatically improved performance over the period. 
These reforms acted as the second best strategy to enhance economic growth in the 
absence of a well-defined property rights system.  
The new regime ushered under Putin concentrated on re-introducing the state as a 
major player in the Russian economy. The influence of the oligarchs was significantly 
diminished, especially in the political sector (Goldman, 2003; Tompson, 2005), while 
asset-stripping behaviour was also dramatically reduced. The federal government curbed 
regional bureaucracy by adopting the “vertical flow of power” approach and transferring 
the decision-making power back to the central state (Gregory and Schrettl, 2004; Bahry, 
2005; Dininio and Orttung, 2005; Ivanenko, 2005).  
Interestingly, the new policy was still a somewhat free market approach in that all 
prices and output quantities, except that in a few strategic industries, were allowed to be 
determined by the market.
i
 However, an important aspect of the Putin regime was that the 
state re-engaged directly with Russia’s main industries. It openly regained control over 
Russia’s most strategic economic sectors, such as energy (Boussena and Locatelli, 2005; 
Goldman, 2008; Kalyuzhnova and Nygaard, 2008; Hanson 2009; Rossiaud and Locatelli, 
2009). However, as Tompson (2008) points out, although the state did concentrate on 
increasing its stake in oil enterprises, it did not specifically target Russia’s natural 
resource industry alone, but instead acquired shares in a wide variety of economic 
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sectors. Woodruff (2007) notes that Russia’s state-owned stock accounted for 20 percent 
of market capitalisation in 2003, a figure which rose to 35 percent in 2007.  
Significantly, while many (for e.g. Smith, 2009; Vidova, 2009) suggest that Russia 
under the Putin regime was steering a steady course through the re-nationalisation of 
enterprises, I argue that the government, above all, pursued the co-ownership policy, 
where it formed co-partnerships with private investors in many important industries. In 
other words, the co-partnership is a product of a complete state ownership of corporations 
as in the old Soviet Union, and the disastrous “laissez-faire” system, which existed during 
the Yeltsin era, but was carried out with incomplete claims over assets. I believe that such 
co-partnership system was formed in response to severe hold-up costs generated by weak 
property rights. In other words, the new regime recognised the necessity of becoming an 
active corporate partner with private investors to ameliorate costs associated with 
substantial hold-up due to the propensity of oligarchs and local bureaucracy to divert 
wealth. Interestingly, Gaddy (2007) points out that the Putin regime did not necessary 
pursue re-nationalisation, but the central state effectively acts as a rent manager, having 
complete control over oil and gas rent sharing system. To put another way, the federal 
government does not differentiate between state and private ownership, as it successfully 
extracts formal and informal taxes from private firms. In this paper, it is argued that while 
the central state is undoubtedly in charge of this rent sharing system, it also favours the 
co-partnership mechanism. This mechanism allows the state to bypass the necessity to 
appoint “loyal agents in the right positions... to ensure that the rents are properly 
distributed” (Gaddy, 2007:42), as the state now has a major corporate governance 
presence, which ultimately translates into significant decision-making power; while also 
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permitting the state to benefit from injection of private investment funds. Lane (2008) 
notes a striking increase of Western investment during the Putin period. From the 
investors’ perspective, such state-private co-partnership system can act as a substitute 
governing mechanism to more assure private investors of their expected return, as the 
state cannot allow corporate insiders and lower level bureaucrats of the 1990s to engage 
in extensive tunnelling of wealth. 
In the next section I provide a detailed study of ownership structure in Russia during 
the 1998-2006 period. I show that many firms in oil and other natural resource sectors, as 
well as manufacturing industry have adopted the state-private co-partnership system. I 
believe that by having a significant ownership stake in the firm the state can effectively 
constrain appropriation of private investment funds as well as large government subsidies 
by insiders.    
 
3. Corporate ownership in Russia 
 
The study is based on firms which trade on the Russian Trading System (RTS) stock 
exchange, which is one of Russia’s leading stock exchanges, between 1998 and 2006. 
Russian Trading System stock exchange (RTS) serves as the main benchmark for the 
Russian securities industry. It is based on RTS 50 most liquid and capitalised shares. The 
firm sample consists of energy, metallurgy and mining, manufacturing, communications, 
banking and services, food and retail, transport and utility enterprises, which represents 
all major sectors of the Russian industry. At the time of data collection, 329 companies 
were listed on RTS stock exchange; however, due to the absence of information for 
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ownership of several companies, the final sample was reduced to 245. Table 1 below 
shows industrial composition of RTS index.
ii
 
 
[insert Table 1 here] 
 
I identify key shareholders (represented by the fraction of capital they own) from 
company annual or quarterly reports, which were provided by SKRIN database. In 
general, Russian corporate ownership can be described as highly concentrated, where the 
average fraction of capital held by the principal shareholder is approximately 50 percent. 
Therefore, even though the reports officially disclose all shareholders that own more than 
five percent of firm’s capital, it is determined that all major owners hold a very 
significant share of capital.
iii
 If the reports state that there is more than one principal 
investor present, all types of large shareholders with large ownership stakes were noted. 
I identify the following owner types - federal government (direct state ownership), 
state firm or financial institution (indirect central state ownership), regional state 
(regional state ownership), domestic firm or financial institution (private ownership), 
individuals (private ownership), and finally, foreign firm and financial institution (foreign 
ownership). In order to provide a more general overview of Russian corporate ownership, 
direct and indirect central state ownership are grouped together, while separating this 
ownership category from regional state ownership, as the latter is being curbed under 
Putin administration. In addition, I note the presence of the new state-private co-
partnership system, or co-ownership between the central state and private investors, 
which was increasingly implemented with the advent of the Putin regime. Table 2 below 
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summarises the number and type of owners present across Russia’s corporate sector 
between 1998 and 2006, as is reported by companies trading on RTS. 
 
                                                     [insert Table 2 here] 
 
Direct or indirect state ownership represents the number of firms in which the 
federal government held a majority stake throughout the given period, or in other words, 
was the single key shareholder. Significant presence of the state shareholder can be 
attributed to a large number of electricity companies in the firm sample, which are the 
subsidiaries of the United Energy Systems of Russia (where the state is the largest 
investor), trading on the RTS. An increased number of directly or indirectly state-owned 
corporations in the latter period can be attributed to the restructuring of the United 
Energy Systems of Russia, where a number of new subsidiaries have emerged. 
One must note a sharp decline in regional government investor type from 2003 
onwards. These findings are consistent with the new policy of corporate control being 
transferred back to the federal government and limitation of decision-making power of 
regional officials, who previously enjoyed autonomy over corporate assets. 
The findings show that the number of private investors, both domestic and 
foreign, also increased steadily throughout the period. This is unsurprising as Russia’s 
rapid economic growth has attracted a large amount of private investment funds. 
However, it is important to point out that approximately 80 percent of this “private” 
corporate ownership structure is represented by two or more large shareholders (for 
example, the firm is owned by a foreign corporation and a domestic financial institution). 
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Such combinations of shareholders account for a relatively high number of domestic and 
foreign participants in the table.
iv
 Individual ownership has remained relatively low 
throughout the given period.  
Significantly, it can be seen from the table that the new state-private co-ownership 
system, which captures firms that are co-owned by the central state and private investors, 
increased dramatically with the introduction of the Putin regime. This is consistent with 
the government’s policy of regaining a certain degree of control over the Russian 
industry without pursuing the re-nationalisation objective. Moreover, as such co-
partnership mechanism can be found across energy sector (see Table 3), it is argued that 
the central state may have favoured this strategy over the strict “rent management” 
mechanism, which involves extensive monitoring of private owners by the state in order 
to collect a sufficient amount of economic rents. To put another way, through partial 
ownership the state can successfully amass energy sector rents in a less costly manner.  
However, findings in Table 3 below show that the central state did not only seek 
to form co-partnerships in energy enterprises, but across all economic sectors that can be 
characterised by high asset specificity, large lump-sum investment outlays, and 
consequently, high hold-up costs. Specifically, the energy sector has increased its 
proportion of co-owned enterprises from 6% in 1998 to 16% in 2006, while metallurgy 
and mining industry raised this share from 0% to 21%.
v
 One notices a dramatic increase 
in the state-private co-partnership system across manufacturing firms (from 0% in 1998 
to 30% in 2006). Transport industry, which consists of airlines and shipping, saw the 
proportion of state-private co-ownership mechanism decrease from 29% to 14%, 
however, this major change can be attributed to a small sample of firms in this economic 
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sector (seven transport companies trading on RTS were identified). Finally, it can be seen 
that the utility sector, even though mainly controlled by the central state, also tended to 
adopt the co-partnership system, where the proportion of co-owned companies 
augmented from 2% in 1998 to 18% in 2006. 
Significantly, it can be seen from the table that the proportion of co-owned 
enterprises across communications, banking and services and food and retail sectors (all 
of which are not defined by high asset specificity and large initial investment outlays) 
decreased steadily throughout the period. Banking and services industry expanded rapidly 
between 1998 and 2006, yet this economic sector did not introduce the co-partnership 
system, producing an overall effect of a decline in the co-ownership mechanism. Food 
and retail sector has also grown, but similar to banking and services industry, it did not 
aim to form a partnership between private investors and the state, thus resulting in a fall 
in co-owned enterprises from 20% in 1998 to 7% in 2006. The share of the state-private 
co-partnership system remained low (7%) relative to other forms of ownerships across 
communications industry.  
 
[insert Table 3 here] 
 
These findings are consistent with the argument that instead of pursuing the re-
nationalisation objective, the central government introduced the new state-private co-
partnership system, which it expected to act as a second-best strategy to well-defined 
property rights. In that, the new regime recognised that the economy lacked an efficient 
property rights system, and it also recognised the necessity of becoming an active 
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corporate partner with private investors (who could offer significant investment funds to 
the growing economy) to ameliorate costs associated with substantial hold-up due to the 
propensity of oligarchs and local bureaucracy to divert wealth.
vi
 The policy also implies 
that such co-partnership system plays a more dominant role across enterprises 
characterised by large lump-sum investments outlays and high asset specificity. These 
lead to higher hold-up costs stemming from extensive rent-seeking by company insiders 
and local bureaucrats, and thus call for enhanced monitoring by the state.  
 
4. Conclusion and discussion 
In this paper I argue that with the advent of the Putin regime in 2000, the Russian state 
did not essentially pursue the re-nationalisation goal, although it is widely recognised that 
the new government began to regain control over the Russian industry. Undoubtedly, 
having autonomy (through direct ownership or formal and informal taxes) over  energy 
sector rents provided the federal government with much needed funds to start re-building 
Russia’s industrial base and increasing the country’s living standards. However, after 
studying ownership structure of firms listed on the Russian Trading Systems stock 
exchange during the 1998-2006 period, it can be seen that the government aspired to 
introduce a co-ownership system between the central state and private investors in all 
industries defined by high asset specificity and substantial investment outlays.  
Contemporary Russia, consistent with its past, remains characterised by a weak 
property rights system, which impedes its commercial development. Despite being a 
recipient of significant economic rents, the government recognises the need to secure 
private investment funds, which aid economic growth.
vii
 Thus it is the state’s objective to 
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adopt a mechanism, which can guarantee investors their expected return. This, I argue, 
can be accomplished through the state-private co-partnership. Without the co-partnership 
strategy, many projects face an under-investment trap. Specifically, there remains a 
potential conflict between the state and insider managers or local bureaucrats, who have a 
tendency to invest sub-optimally. As was demonstrated by Russia’s privatisation 
initiative, irrespective of their time discount preferences, the insiders can be expected to 
adopt shorter term investment horizons, because they lack secure claims to future income. 
Thus, even if they sell their interest, the insecurity of the future assets income claims will 
appropriately be subject to a risk-adjusted discount rate, which may increase overtime. 
Subsequently, in this paper it is suggested that in the absence of well-defined property 
rights, private investment can be secured if the central state makes a credible commitment 
to investors to protect their funds from wealth diversion behaviour of company managers 
and lower level bureaucrats. This, in turn, can be achieved by giving the central state an 
active role in company governing structure through firm co-ownership, which is all the 
more important in firms with highly specific assets, requiring large investment outlays.  
 Naturally, one may address the issue of credible commitment to private investors 
by the state, i.e. how can investors be confident that the state itself will not turn into a 
predator. However, it can be argued that the state is only likely to display predatory 
behaviour when under threat - if it expects to receive fewer economic benefits in the next 
period. In this case, the government is already a major owner of Russia’s resources, 
hence the level of threat is somewhat limited. Moreover, the state’s long-term goal is to 
sponsor economic development with private investment funds in the absence of 
enforceable property rights, therefore it needs to assure investors of their expected 
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returns. In the case of ex post contractual non-compliance, or investor expropriation, 
investors will choose to withdraw their funds (if possible) and refrain from future 
opportunities. Consequently, the state’s aspiration to achieve long-term development will 
prove to be illusive. To put another way, if private investors’ expected returns do not 
reflect a risk-adjusted competitive return due to non-commitment  by the government 
(which may include the state’s wealth tunnelling behaviour, its political agenda or any 
other forms of predatory behaviour), the government will not be able to secure private 
funds over the desired long-term period.  
To summarise, I argue that given a poorly-defined property rights system in 
Russia, the state aspires to achieve long-run economic growth by introducing the new co-
partnership system between the state and private investors. This system can act as an 
effective substitute corporate governance mechanism, in that it can reduce significant 
hold-up costs stemming from rent-seeking behaviour of corporate insiders. It is also 
argued that the state is unlikely to find it profitable to engage in predatory behaviour, as 
private investors need to be assured of their expected returns in order to sponsor Russia’s 
corporate growth.  
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Figure 1. Performance of RTS index during 1998-2006 
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Table 1. Number of firms belonging to eight industrial sectors registered on RTS during 
1998-2006 
 
Year Manufacturing Utility Metallurgy 
& Mining 
Energy Transport Communi
cations 
Banking   
& 
Services 
Food 
& 
Retail 
Total 
1998 34 54 15 18 7 12 5 5 150 
1999 40 58 20 19 7 14 8 6 172 
2000 41 58 19 19 7 15 9 7 175 
2001 41 58 19 19 7 15 14 9 182 
2002 42 58 19 19 7 15 16 10 186 
2003 43 58 22 19 7 15 17 13 194 
2004 43 63 23 19 7 15 21 13 204 
2005 46 101 24 19 7 15 23 14 249 
2006 45 106 24 19 7 15 23 14 253 
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Table 2. Major owners of firms trading on RTS during 1998-2006 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
State (direct/indirect) 
 
64 74 71 69 65 59 63 80 82 
Regional state 
 
8 11 11 11 10 7 4 3 3 
Domestic 
firm/financial 
institution 
 
15 41 53 54 63 74 73 70 72 
Foreign 
firm/financial 
institution 
 
14 27 21 19 27 24 25 27 34 
Individual 
 
3 8 7 9 8 8 3 8 9 
New state-private co-
ownership 
 
6 9 17 20 20 29 25 26 45 
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Table 3. State-private co-ownership across eight industrial sectors during 1998-
2006 
 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Utility 
 
1 
(2%) 
1 
(2%) 
4 
(7%) 
5 
(9%) 
5 
(9%) 
12 
(21%) 
10 
(16%) 
10 
(10%) 
19 
(18%) 
Energy 
 
1 
(6%) 
0 
(0%) 
1 
(5%) 
2 
(11%) 
2 
(11%) 
3 
(16%) 
2 
(11%) 
3 
(16%) 
3 
(16%) 
Metallurgy & 
Mining 
 
0 
(0%) 
1 
(5%) 
1 
(5%) 
2 
(10%) 
2 
(10%) 
2 
(9%) 
3 
(17%) 
3 
(13%) 
5 
(21%) 
Transport  
 
 
2 
(29%) 
2 
(29%) 
1 
(14%) 
1 
(14%) 
1 
(14%) 
1 
(14%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
1 
(14%) 
Manufacturing 
 
0 
(0%) 
 
3 
(8%) 
7 
(17%) 
7 
(17%) 
7 
(17%) 
8 
(19%) 
7 
(16%) 
7 
(15%) 
14 
(30%) 
Communications 
 
1 
(8%) 
 
1 
(7%) 
1 
(7%) 
1 
(7%) 
1 
(7%) 
1 
(7%) 
1 
(7%) 
1 
(7%) 
1 
(7%) 
Banking & 
Services 
 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
1 
(11%) 
1 
(7%) 
1 
(6%) 
1 
(6%) 
0 
(0%) 
1 
(4%) 
1 
(4%) 
Food & Retail 
 
1 
(20%) 
 
1 
(17%) 
1 
(14%) 
1 
(11%) 
1 
(10%) 
1 
(8%) 
2 
(15%) 
1 
(7%) 
1 
(7%) 
Total 
 
6 9 17 20 20 29 25 26 45 
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i
 The policy was supported by relatively improved legal infrastructure, which reduced the 
costs of transacting across the market 
ii
 The overall number of companies reported in the table is 253. However, it was possible 
to obtain accurate ownership information on 245 firms 
iii
 Only 1 “widely held” corporation was identified, where the principal shareholder 
owned less than 5 percent of firm’s capital 
iv
 If the firm is partially owned by the state, it falls into the state-private co-ownership 
category 
v
 The percentage figure denotes the proportion of state-private owned enterprises relative 
to the overall number of firms in this industry 
vi
 Lessons learned form the privatisation process in the 1990s 
vii
 The government also aims to protect its extensive subsidies, which can be appropriated 
by insider managers and lower level bureaucrats under a weak legal system  
